Se också ett BBC-program med video: Israel unveils new drone that can fly to Gulf
Israels ögon i skyn
Av Yaakov Katz
10/07/2011 12:05
Flygvapnet måste ofta agera snabbt och i smyg. Det är där UAV skvadronen och de företag som förser den med sina avancerade drönare kommer in i bilden.
Foto: Courtesy
Det var i mitten av januari 2009 och IDFs marktrupper var djupt inne i Gazaremsan och Operation Cast Lead - som syftade till att försvaga Hamas - närmade sig sitt slut.
Konkreta uppgifter som erhållits genom Mossad för flera dagar sedan visade tidigare att ett fartyg med ett antal containrar fyllda med avancerade iranska vapen hade ankrat i Port Sudan vid Röda havet. Behållarna, sade Mossads källor, höll på att lastas på lastbilar för den långa färden norrut till tunnlarna under Egypten-Gaza-gränsen.
Olika alternativ övervägdes för hur man skulle handskas med konvojen, som Mossad hade tipsat var lastad med 120 ton av vapen, inklusive iranska Fajr-5 artilleriraketer, som kan nå Tel Aviv, en förmåga Hamas inte hade vid den tiden. Några i försvarets föreslog ett flyganfall mot konvojen för att förhindra att raketer nådde Gazaremsan.
Andra varnade för att med Israel redan under stor internationell kritik för att den stigande dödssiffran och omfattande förödelsen i Gaza, skulle nyheten om en israeliskt attack i ett annat land inte hjälp och kunde även skada Israels ansträngningar på den diplomatiska fronten.
Det slutliga beslutet lades inför premiärminister Ehud Olmert och försvarsminister Ehud Barak, som efter en kort debatt gav grönt ljus för attacken mot konvojen med 17 lastbilar. Tidpunkten var avgörande eftersom när bilarna väl hade kommit till Egypten visste alla att Israel inte skulle kunna attackera. Det måste göras medan lastbilarna fortfarande var inne i Sudan.
Frågan var nu hur man skulle genomföra attacken. Att skicka stridsflygplan till Sudan var riskabelt. Vad skulle hända om det uppstod ett fel i ett av de plan eller ett upptäcktes av det egyptiska eller saudiska flygvapnet, som även arbetar över Röda havet, den sannolika flygrutten? Hela uppdraget skulle äventyras.
Ett annat bekymmer var vad som skulle hända om stridsflygplan dök upp för tidigt. De skulle inte kunna stanna i sudanesiska luftrum för evigt och skulle begränsas av den mängd bränsle som de kunde bära.
Det beslut som fattades till slut av Israels flygvapens (IAF) befälhavare generalmajor Ido Nehustan var att använda obemannade flygfarkoster (UAV), även kallad drönare, på grund av deras förmåga att sväva under längre perioder över ett område som den stora sudanesiska öknen, där de kunde sitta och vänta på att konvojen skulle dyka upp.
"När du attackerar ett fast mål, framför allt ett stort ett, är det bättre att använda jetflygplan. Men med ett rörligt mål med ingen bestämd tid för aktionen är UAV bäst, eftersom de kan sväva extremt högt och förbli osynliga tills måletrör sig," citerade en brittisk tidning en israelisk säkerhetskälla efter attacken.
Den UAV som valts för verksamheten var Heron TP - Israels största drone - för att utföra övervakningen av insatsområdet och Hermes 450, Israels främsta attackdrone.
Natten för bombningen fanns det några moln, men för det mesta var himlen klar, liksom de flesta nätter mitt i januari i Sudan. Som smugglarna, några sudanesiska och några palestinska, färdades genom den stora öknen, var det sista i deras sinnen att israeliska drönare redan spårat dem. Då missiler träffade sina mål var det redan för sent. Femtio smugglare rapporteras ha dödats och alla lastbilar förstördes.
Detta är den påstådda historien - som bygger på utländska pressen rapporter - en av Israels mer monumentala flyganfall under senare år.
Men liksom andra hemliga operationer som hänförs till Israel, tog landet även här aldrig på sig ansvaret. Det sprider dock lite ljus över den växande roll UAV - som varierar i storlek och form - spelar i Israels krig och verksamhet, vilket reser frågor inte bara om framtiden för tekniken utan också om moralen bakom dess användning på slagfältet.
Israels första erfarenhet av obemannade flygplan var 1969 under utnötningskriget.
På den tiden behövde Israel desperat information om egyptiska militära rörelser på andra sidan av Suezkanalen. Ett team från militära underrättelsetjänsten kom upp med en idé. Det köps ett antal fjärrstyrda flygplan, använde maskeringstejp för att fästa en automatisk stillbildskamera och skickade dem över kanalen för att knäppa några bilder.
"Vi var tvungna att använda kikare för att spåra de små planen, och då och då tappade vi bort dem", erinrade Haim Eshed, tidigare chef för försvarets Space Division och en medlem av det team som flög fjärrstyrda flygplan i Sinai.
"När de landade tog vi kameran, skickade filmen som skulle framkallas och sedan studerade vi bilderna."
Inte alla trodde på UAV och Eshed - som vid den tiden tjänstgjorde som chef för MI:s forskning och utvecklingsdivision - lyckades föra projektet över till försvarsdepartementet. Där togs det över av MAFAT, ministeriets FoU-direktorat.
År 1971 etablerade IAF en UAV-skvadron efter ankomsten av Firebee, en USA-tillverkad UAV, som användes främst längs Suezkanalen för att spåra egyptiska surface-to-air missiler SAM system.
Den startades som en missil och landade med fallskärm.
Israels dramatiska språng inom UAV kom 1979 med ankomsten av Scout, den första drönare som utvecklats av Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) som användes i stor utsträckning under det första Libanonkriget 1982.
En minnesvärd operationen var när en scoutoperatör hittade ett SA-8 SAM-system gömt under ett träd i Syrien. Operatören fick hjälp av en närliggande Phantompilot och riktade honom till målet, som omedelbart bombades och förstördes. År 1992 deltog Scout i flyganfall som dödade Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbollahs ledare vid den tidpunkten, i södra Libanon. UAV hardeanvänts för att lokalisera fordonet och att rapportera resultatet av tillslaget tillbaka till Israel.
"Detta var det stora genombrottet," har en topptjänsteman på försvarsdepartementets UAV-direktorat sagt. "IAF drevs en skvadron på den tiden men alla i IDF har dragit nytta av verksamheten och folk började förstå den outnyttjade potentialen."
Under åren sedan dess har IAF använt och pensionerat ett ytterligare antal UAV-system, men till skillnad från sina större bemannade plattformar - stridsplan, attackhelikoptrar och transportplan - är dessa UAV helt blåvita, utvecklas och tillverkas av israeliska företag som IAI, Elbit Systems och Aeronautics.
En demonstration av Israels överlägsna tekniska kapacitet var tydlig under 2010 när israeliska företag sålde $1.000.000.000 värde av UAV och tillhörande utrustning i hela världen och fem länder - Tyskland, Australien, Spanien, Frankrike och Kanada - flög israeliska drönare i Afghanistan.
Ytterligare bevis lämnades i augusti då Frankrike valde IAI:s Heron TP - Israels största UAV med ett vingspann på 26 meter, som en Boeing 737 - före USA:s Predator B.
Men vad är hemligheten bakom Israels framgång? "Det finns tre förklaringar till Israels framgång i att bli världsledande inom utveckling och produktion av UAV", förklarade en topptjänsteman inom MAFAT. "Vi har otroliga människor och innovationsförmåga, krigserfarenhet som hjälper oss att förstå vad vi behöver och att omedelbart operativt använda eftersom vi alltid mitt i en konflikt som ger oss möjlighet att fullända våra system."
Amit Wolff, en ung ingenjör vid IAIs Malat Division som utvecklar och tillverkar UAV, sammanfattar dessa tre element.
Wolff tog värvning i IDF i början av 1990 och tjänstgjorde i Maglans elitenhet ett antal år, och uppnådde kaptens grad.
Efter hans utmönstring studerade han till ingenjör och var då anställd av IAI. Ett antal år senare blev Wolff en teamledare för utveckling.
En dag möttes Wolff och hans team på ett kafé nära IAI huvudkontor - bredvid Ben-Gurion International Airport - för en av sina ordinarie brainstorming.
Som före detta befälhavare i Maglan visste Wolff vad han skulle ha velat ha när han ledde sina trupper på operationer inne i tättbefolkade palestinska och libanesiska städer och byar.
"Vi började diskutera möjligheten att skapa ett lätt UAV som kan tas med i fältet, snabbt packas upp och kunna starta och landa vertikalt utan behov av en landningsbana", minns han.
Tanken var snabbt nerskissad på några kladdpapper på kafét, och några dagar senare närmade sig Wolff Arnold Nathan, chef för IAI FoU division Engineering, som lyssnade till förslaget och beslöt att anslå $30.000 för dess fortsatta utveckling.
Investeringen lönade sig och ungefär två år senare, i oktober 2010, presenterade statliga företaget Panther sin första vinkelbara rotor UAV, som kan sväva över mål och vertikalt starta och landa på slagfältet.
Med en vikt av ca 65 kg är Panther är utrustad med tre små elektriska motorer och kan stanna i luften på 10.000 fot i sex timmar. En mindre version, som kallas Mini Panther, väger bara 12 kg. och kan stanna i luften i cirka två timmar.
"I allmänhet kommer våra idéer kommer från en rad källor," förklarar Wolff. "Vi följer noga olika uppfinningar på Internet för att se om de är tillämpliga, vi är i nära kontakt med försvaret för att förstå IDF:s behov, och vi drar också nytta av våra egna erfarenheter som soldater och aktiva reservister."
Vid sidan av UAV-skvadronen har IDF och IAF har ett antal ytterligare skvadroner och enheter som använderUAV. UAV-skvadronen använder Heron, en UAV, medan en annan IAF-skvadron använder Hermes 450, Israels främsta attackdrone enligt utländska rapporter och liknande Predator, som används i stor utsträckning av USA för riktade mord i Pakistan och Afghanistan.
IAF planerar nu att inrätta ytterligare en UAV-skvadron i slutet av 2012 som kommer att införliva Heron 1 och Hermes 900, en större version av Hermes 450 med möjlighet att transportera större nyttolaster.
För marktrupper används drönare under Sky Rider Program, som såg leverans av Elbit s Skylark 1 till IDF-bataljoner under 2010 som ett led i ett försök att ge befälhavare snabb over-the-hill information utan att vara beroende av IAF. Försvarsministeriet utvärderar nu Skylark II som en drönare för brigadbefälhavare.
För de mest högflygande, som kallas Hale (hög höjd lång uthållighet) har IAF köpt ett antal Heron TP UAV från IAI som har förmåga att hålla sig i luften i flera dagar i taget och som därför har blivit kända i Israel som "drönaren som kan nå Iran." Skvadronen som planeras för att driva Heron TP är tänkt att tas i drift i slutet av 2011.
"Detta UAV placerar oss på en ny nivå när det gäller att samla information," förklarar en högt uppsatt IAF-officer.
"På grund av sin storlek kan den transportera flera olika nyttolaster och genomföra en mängd olika uppdrag samtidigt."
Den israeliska genialiteten ligger inte bara i utvecklingen av drones utan, lika viktigt, i vilka nyttolaster det bär och de system som utför jobbet. IAI och Elbit, till exempel, har gjort namn för sig själva för att utveckla självständig start och landning. Allt som krävs är fyra knappar för att få Heron TP, som är lika bred som en Boeing 737, att starta och landa.
På grund av uppdragen en drönare kan utföra, allt från regelbunden övervakning för ett luftangrepp. i Gaza, till exempel, har palestinierna gett drönarna smeknamnet Zanana, för det surrande ljudet de gör när de flyger över det Hamas-styrda territoriet.
"Drones är bäst för så kallade 3D-uppdrag - "dull, dirty, dangerous" - tråkigt, smutsigt och farligt" sa en högIAF-officer.
"Dess driftskostnader är mindre än ett bemannat flygplan, människoliv sätts inte i fara och de kan ibland göra ett bättre jobb."
Ett exempel är i marinen, som för närvarande använder helikoptrar för att flyga framför fartyg och hjälpa landet att bygga upp en bild av havet utanför räckvidden för vad fartygsbaserade radar kan se. Varje helikopter har en besättning på minst tre officerare som ibland kan färdas i timmar fram och tillbaka över ett hav.
"Varför sätta en besättningens liv i fara på uppdrag som är trist och tråkigt när samma uppgift kan utföras av en UAV," sade en försvarstjänsteman.
Av den anledningen har marinen genomfört ett antal experiment med UAV med olika lång räckvidd i syfte att hitta en som kan starta och landa på ett fartyg.
FRAMTIDENS värld av UAV är inne i den lilla husvagnen på Palmahim Air Force Base där unga manliga och kvinnliga officerare i jumpsuits sitter framför konsoler som kantas av stora TV-skärmar för att titta på strömmen av övervakningsbilder från drönare de positionerar med det närliggande joysticken.
Dessa små och mobila kommandohusvagnar placerar UAV-föraren på ett säkert avstånd från uppdraget, var den än kan vara - över Gazaremsan och i Libanon, spårning av Hamas och Hizbollahs vapenöverföringar.
Siffrorna är redan överväldigande, med en dramatisk ökning av in-flygtimmar IAF spelat in under det senaste decenniet. Idag utgör UAV cirka en tredjedel av IAF:s totala årliga flygtimmar. Det ger också ett par hundra timmar av visuell information(VISINT) dagligen som sedan måste bearbetas och katalogiseras.
Iom IAF är det ingen tvekan om att UAVs har fört dem ett stort steg framåt de senaste 20 åren, det är bara början. Vid flygvvapenets "2030 Workshop," nyligen talade IAFs befälhavare Nehustan om en framtid när flygvapnets flotta kommer att bestå enbart av stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) och UAV.
"Ingen skulle ha trott det för 20 år sedan att vi skulle vara där vi är idag, och det är svårt att exakt förutsäga var vi kommer att vara om ytterligare 20 år," En högre försvar sjänsteman från MAFAT tillade med ett leende: "Ytterst är himlen gränsen.......
Israel’s eye in the sky
By YAAKOV KATZ
10/07/2011 12:05
Photo by: Courtesy
It was the middle of January 2009, and IDF ground forces were pushing deep into the Gaza Strip as Operation Cast Lead – aimed at weakening Hamas – was nearing its end.
Concrete intelligence reportedly obtained by the Mossad several days earlier indicated that a ship carrying a number of containers packed with advanced Iranian weaponry had docked in Port Sudan, on the Red Sea. The containers, the Mossad’s sources said, were being loaded onto the backs of trucks for the long drive north to the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border.
Different options were considered for how to deal with the convoy, which the Mossad had been tipped off was carrying 120 tons of weaponry including Iranian Fajr-5 artillery rockets, capable of striking Tel Aviv, a capability Hamas did not have at the time. Some in the defense establishment proposed an airstrike against the convoy to prevent the rockets from reaching the Gaza Strip.
Others warned that with Israel already under major international criticism for the rising death toll and extensive devastation in Gaza, news of an Israeli strike in another country would not help and could even damage Israeli efforts on the diplomatic front.
The final decision was likely brought before prime minister Ehud Olmert and defense minister Ehud Barak who, after a short debate, gave the green light to attack the convoy of 17 trucks. The timing was crucial since once the trucks crossed into Egypt everyone knew that Israel would not be able to attack. It had to be done while the trucks were still inside Sudan.
The question now was how to carry out the strike. Sending fighter jets to Sudan was risky. What would happen if there was a malfunction in one of the planes or one was detected by the Egyptian or Saudi air forces, which also operate over the Red Sea, the likely flight route? The entire mission would be jeopardized.
Another concern was what would happen if the fighter jets showed up too early. They wouldn’t be able to stay in Sudanese airspace forever and would be limited by the amount of fuel they could carry.
The decision ultimately taken by Israel Air Force (IAF) commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan was to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also referred to as drones, due to their ability to hover for extended periods of time over an area of operations like the vast Sudanese desert, where they could just sit and wait for the convoy to show up.
“When you attack a fixed target, especially a big one, you are better off using jet aircraft. But with a moving target with no definite time for the move, UAVs are best, as they can hover extremely high and remain unseen until the target is on the move,” an Israeli security source was quoted by one British paper after the attack.
The UAVs chosen for the operation were the Heron TP – Israel’s largest drone – to provide surveillance of the area of operations and the Hermes 450, Israel’s main attack drone.
The night of the bombing, there were some clouds but for the most part the skies were clear, like most mid-January nights in Sudan. As the smugglers, some Sudanese and some Palestinian, made their way through the vast desert, the last thing on their minds was that Israeli drones were already tracking them. As the missiles streaked to their targets it was already too late. Fifty smugglers were reportedly killed and all of the trucks were destroyed.
This is the alleged story – based on foreign press reports – of one of Israel’s more monumental airstrikes in recent years.
But like other covert operations attributed to Israel, here too, the country has never claimed responsibility. It does however shed some light on the growing role UAVs – ranging in size and shape – are playing in Israel’s wars and operations, raising questions not only about the future of the technology but also of the morality behind its use on the battlefield.
Israel’s first experience with unmanned aircraft was in 1969 during the War of Attrition.
At the time, Israel desperately needed intelligence on Egyptian military movements on the other side of the Suez Canal. A team from Military Intelligence came up with an idea. It purchased a number of remote-control planes, used masking tape to attach an automatic stills camera and sent it over the canal to snap some photos.
“We had to use binoculars to track the small planes, and once in a while we would lose sight of them,” recalled Haim Eshed, former head of the Defense Ministry’s Space Division and a member of the team that flew the remote-control planes in the Sinai.
“When they landed, we took the camera, sent the film to be developed and then studied the pictures.”
Not everyone believed in the UAVs and Eshed – who served at the time as head of MI’s Research and Development Division – succeeded in moving the project over to the Defense Ministry. There it was taken over by MAFAT, the ministry’s R&D directorate.
In 1971, the IAF established a UAV squadron following the arrival of the Firebee, an American-made UAV, which was put to use mostly along the Suez Canal to track Egyptian surface-to-air missile SAM systems.
It was launched like a missile and landed with a parachute.
Israel’s dramatic leap in the field of UAVs came in 1979 with the arrival of the Scout, the first drone developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), which was used extensively during the First Lebanon War in 1982.
One memorable operation was when a Scout operator spotted an SA-8 SAM system hidden under a tree in Syria. The operator got through to a nearby Phantom pilot and directed him to the target, which was immediately bombed and destroyed. In 1992, the Scout participated in the airstrike which killed Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, in southern Lebanon. The UAV was used to locate the vehicle and to report the results of the strike back to Israel.
“This was the big breakthrough,” a top official in the Defense Ministry’s UAV directorate said. “The IAF operated a single squadron at the time but everyone in the IDF benefited from its operations and people began to understand the untapped potential.”
IN THE years since, the IAF has used and retired a number of additional UAV systems, but unlike its larger manned platforms – fighter jets, attack helicopters and transport aircraft – the UAVs are strictly blue-andwhite, developed and manufactured by Israeli companies such as IAI, Elbit Systems and Aeronautics.
A demonstration of Israel’s superior technological capabilities was evident in 2010 when Israeli companies sold $1 billion worth of UAVs and associated equipment around the world and five countries – Germany, Australia, Spain, France and Canada – were flying Israelimade drones in Afghanistan.
Further proof was provided in August when France selected IAI’s Heron TP – Israel’s largest UAV with a wingspan of 26 meters, like a Boeing 737 – over America’s Predator B.
But what is the secret to Israel’s success? “There are three explanations for Israel’s success in becoming a world leader in development and production of UAVs,” explained a top official from MAFAT. “We have unbelievable people and innovation, combat experience that helps us understand what we need and immediate operational use since we are always in a conflict which allows us to perfect our systems.”
Amit Wolff, a young engineer at IAI’s Malat Division which develops and manufactures UAVs, encapsulates these three elements.
Wolff enlisted in the IDF in the early 1990s and served in the elite Maglan Unit for a number of years, attaining the rank of captain.
After his discharge, he studied engineering and was then hired by IAI. A number of years ago, Wolff became a development team leader.
One day, Wolff and his team met at a coffee shop near IAI headquarters – located next to Ben- Gurion International Airport – for one of their regular brainstorming sessions.
As the former commander in Maglan, Wolff knew what he would have liked to have when leading his troops on operations inside densely populated Palestinian and Lebanese cities and villages.
“We started discussing the possibility of creating a lightweight UAV which can be taken into the field, be quickly unpacked and be capable of taking off and landing vertically without the need for a runway,” he recalls.
The idea was quickly sketched on some scrap paper at the coffee shop, and a few days later Wolff approached Arnold Nathan, director of IAI’s R&D engineering division, who listened to the proposal and decided to allocate $30,000 for its continued development.
The investment paid off and about two years later, in October 2010, the government- owned company unveiled the Panther, its first tilt-rotor UAV, which can hover over targets and vertically take off and land in the battlefield.
Weighing about 65 kg., the Panther is fitted with three small electric motors and can stay airborne at 10,000 feet for six hours. A smaller version, called the Mini Panther, weighs a mere 12 kg. and can stay airborne for approximately two hours.
“In general, our ideas come from a number of sources,” Wolff explains. “We closely follow different inventions on the Internet to see if they are applicable, we are in close contact with the defense establishment to understand the IDF’s needs, and we also draw on our own experience as soldiers and active reservists.”
ALONGSIDE THE UAV squadron, the IDF and IAF have a number of additional squadrons and units that operate UAVs. The UAV squadron uses the Heron 1 UAV, while another IAF squadron uses the Hermes 450, Israel’s primary attack drone according to foreign reports and similar to the Predator, which is used extensively by the US in targeted killings in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The IAF is now planning the establishment of an additional UAV squadron by the end of 2012 which will incorporate the Heron 1 and the Hermes 900, a larger version of the Hermes 450 with the ability to carry larger payloads.
In the ground forces, drones are used under the Sky Rider Program, which saw the delivery of Elbit’s Skylark 1 to IDF battalions in 2010 as part of an effort to provide commanders with quick over-the-hill intelligence without being dependent on the IAF. The Defense Ministry is now evaluating the Skylark II as a drone for brigade commanders.
At the top level, called HALE (high altitude long endurance), the IAF has purchased a number of Heron TP UAVs from IAI which have the ability to stay airborne for days at a time and which for that reason have become known in Israel as “the drone that can reach Iran.” The squadron that is planned to operate the Heron TP is slated to become operational by the end of 2011.
“This UAV puts us at a new level when it comes to gathering intelligence,” a senior IAF officer explained.
“Due to its size it can carry multiple payloads and conduct a wide variety of missions at the same time.”
The Israeli genius is not just in the development of the drone itself but just as importantly in the payloads it carries and the systems that operate it. IAI and Elbit, for example, have made names for themselves for developing autonomous takeoff and landing systems. All it takes is four buttons to get the Heron TP, which is as wide as a Boeing 737, turned on and off the ground.
The missions a drone can carry out range from regular surveillance to airstrikes. In Gaza, for example, the Palestinians have given the drones the nickname Zanana, for the buzzing sounds they make as they fly over the Hamas-controlled territory.
“Drones are best for what are known as ‘3D’ missions – dull, dirty and dangerous,” the top IAF officer said.
“Its operation costs are less than a manned aircraft, people are not put in danger and it can sometimes even do a better job.”
One example is in the Navy, which currently uses helicopters to fly ahead of ships and help it build a picture of the sea out of range of what the ship-based radars can see. Each helicopter has a crew of at least three officers who can sometimes sit for hours going back and forth over an ocean.
“Why put a crew’s life in danger on missions that are dull and boring when the same mission can be done by a UAV,” a defense official said.
For that reason, the navy has been conducting a number of experiments with different long-range UAVs with the aim of finding one that can take off from a ship and land there as well.
THE FUTURE world of UAVs is inside the small caravans at the Palmahim Air Force Base where young male and female officers in jumpsuits sit in front of consoles lined with large TV screens watching the surveillance footage stream in from the drone they are moving with the nearby joystick.
These small and mobile command caravans put the UAV operator at a safe distance from the mission, wherever it might be – over the Gaza Strip or in Lebanon, tracking Hamas and Hezbollah arms transfers.
The numbers are already overwhelming, with the IAF recording a dramatic increase of in-flight hours in the past decade. Today, UAVs make up around a third of the IAF’s overall annual flight hours. It also produces a couple hundred hours of visual intelligence (VISINT) on a daily basis which then have to be processed and catalogued.
In the IAF there is no question that while UAVs have made a tremendous leap in the past 20 years, it is just the beginning. At the force’s recent “2030 Workshop,” IAF commander Nehushtan spoke of a future when the air force’s fleet will consist just of the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and UAVs.
“No one would have thought 20 years ago that we would be where we are today, and it is difficult to accurately predict where we will be in another 20 years,” a senior defense official from MAFAT said, adding with a smile: “Ultimately, the sky is the limit.”
Concrete intelligence reportedly obtained by the Mossad several days earlier indicated that a ship carrying a number of containers packed with advanced Iranian weaponry had docked in Port Sudan, on the Red Sea. The containers, the Mossad’s sources said, were being loaded onto the backs of trucks for the long drive north to the tunnels underneath the Egypt-Gaza border.
Different options were considered for how to deal with the convoy, which the Mossad had been tipped off was carrying 120 tons of weaponry including Iranian Fajr-5 artillery rockets, capable of striking Tel Aviv, a capability Hamas did not have at the time. Some in the defense establishment proposed an airstrike against the convoy to prevent the rockets from reaching the Gaza Strip.
Others warned that with Israel already under major international criticism for the rising death toll and extensive devastation in Gaza, news of an Israeli strike in another country would not help and could even damage Israeli efforts on the diplomatic front.
The final decision was likely brought before prime minister Ehud Olmert and defense minister Ehud Barak who, after a short debate, gave the green light to attack the convoy of 17 trucks. The timing was crucial since once the trucks crossed into Egypt everyone knew that Israel would not be able to attack. It had to be done while the trucks were still inside Sudan.
The question now was how to carry out the strike. Sending fighter jets to Sudan was risky. What would happen if there was a malfunction in one of the planes or one was detected by the Egyptian or Saudi air forces, which also operate over the Red Sea, the likely flight route? The entire mission would be jeopardized.
Another concern was what would happen if the fighter jets showed up too early. They wouldn’t be able to stay in Sudanese airspace forever and would be limited by the amount of fuel they could carry.
The decision ultimately taken by Israel Air Force (IAF) commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan was to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also referred to as drones, due to their ability to hover for extended periods of time over an area of operations like the vast Sudanese desert, where they could just sit and wait for the convoy to show up.
“When you attack a fixed target, especially a big one, you are better off using jet aircraft. But with a moving target with no definite time for the move, UAVs are best, as they can hover extremely high and remain unseen until the target is on the move,” an Israeli security source was quoted by one British paper after the attack.
The UAVs chosen for the operation were the Heron TP – Israel’s largest drone – to provide surveillance of the area of operations and the Hermes 450, Israel’s main attack drone.
The night of the bombing, there were some clouds but for the most part the skies were clear, like most mid-January nights in Sudan. As the smugglers, some Sudanese and some Palestinian, made their way through the vast desert, the last thing on their minds was that Israeli drones were already tracking them. As the missiles streaked to their targets it was already too late. Fifty smugglers were reportedly killed and all of the trucks were destroyed.
This is the alleged story – based on foreign press reports – of one of Israel’s more monumental airstrikes in recent years.
But like other covert operations attributed to Israel, here too, the country has never claimed responsibility. It does however shed some light on the growing role UAVs – ranging in size and shape – are playing in Israel’s wars and operations, raising questions not only about the future of the technology but also of the morality behind its use on the battlefield.
Israel’s first experience with unmanned aircraft was in 1969 during the War of Attrition.
At the time, Israel desperately needed intelligence on Egyptian military movements on the other side of the Suez Canal. A team from Military Intelligence came up with an idea. It purchased a number of remote-control planes, used masking tape to attach an automatic stills camera and sent it over the canal to snap some photos.
“We had to use binoculars to track the small planes, and once in a while we would lose sight of them,” recalled Haim Eshed, former head of the Defense Ministry’s Space Division and a member of the team that flew the remote-control planes in the Sinai.
“When they landed, we took the camera, sent the film to be developed and then studied the pictures.”
Not everyone believed in the UAVs and Eshed – who served at the time as head of MI’s Research and Development Division – succeeded in moving the project over to the Defense Ministry. There it was taken over by MAFAT, the ministry’s R&D directorate.
In 1971, the IAF established a UAV squadron following the arrival of the Firebee, an American-made UAV, which was put to use mostly along the Suez Canal to track Egyptian surface-to-air missile SAM systems.
It was launched like a missile and landed with a parachute.
Israel’s dramatic leap in the field of UAVs came in 1979 with the arrival of the Scout, the first drone developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), which was used extensively during the First Lebanon War in 1982.
One memorable operation was when a Scout operator spotted an SA-8 SAM system hidden under a tree in Syria. The operator got through to a nearby Phantom pilot and directed him to the target, which was immediately bombed and destroyed. In 1992, the Scout participated in the airstrike which killed Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, in southern Lebanon. The UAV was used to locate the vehicle and to report the results of the strike back to Israel.
“This was the big breakthrough,” a top official in the Defense Ministry’s UAV directorate said. “The IAF operated a single squadron at the time but everyone in the IDF benefited from its operations and people began to understand the untapped potential.”
IN THE years since, the IAF has used and retired a number of additional UAV systems, but unlike its larger manned platforms – fighter jets, attack helicopters and transport aircraft – the UAVs are strictly blue-andwhite, developed and manufactured by Israeli companies such as IAI, Elbit Systems and Aeronautics.
A demonstration of Israel’s superior technological capabilities was evident in 2010 when Israeli companies sold $1 billion worth of UAVs and associated equipment around the world and five countries – Germany, Australia, Spain, France and Canada – were flying Israelimade drones in Afghanistan.
Further proof was provided in August when France selected IAI’s Heron TP – Israel’s largest UAV with a wingspan of 26 meters, like a Boeing 737 – over America’s Predator B.
But what is the secret to Israel’s success? “There are three explanations for Israel’s success in becoming a world leader in development and production of UAVs,” explained a top official from MAFAT. “We have unbelievable people and innovation, combat experience that helps us understand what we need and immediate operational use since we are always in a conflict which allows us to perfect our systems.”
Amit Wolff, a young engineer at IAI’s Malat Division which develops and manufactures UAVs, encapsulates these three elements.
Wolff enlisted in the IDF in the early 1990s and served in the elite Maglan Unit for a number of years, attaining the rank of captain.
After his discharge, he studied engineering and was then hired by IAI. A number of years ago, Wolff became a development team leader.
One day, Wolff and his team met at a coffee shop near IAI headquarters – located next to Ben- Gurion International Airport – for one of their regular brainstorming sessions.
As the former commander in Maglan, Wolff knew what he would have liked to have when leading his troops on operations inside densely populated Palestinian and Lebanese cities and villages.
“We started discussing the possibility of creating a lightweight UAV which can be taken into the field, be quickly unpacked and be capable of taking off and landing vertically without the need for a runway,” he recalls.
The idea was quickly sketched on some scrap paper at the coffee shop, and a few days later Wolff approached Arnold Nathan, director of IAI’s R&D engineering division, who listened to the proposal and decided to allocate $30,000 for its continued development.
The investment paid off and about two years later, in October 2010, the government- owned company unveiled the Panther, its first tilt-rotor UAV, which can hover over targets and vertically take off and land in the battlefield.
Weighing about 65 kg., the Panther is fitted with three small electric motors and can stay airborne at 10,000 feet for six hours. A smaller version, called the Mini Panther, weighs a mere 12 kg. and can stay airborne for approximately two hours.
“In general, our ideas come from a number of sources,” Wolff explains. “We closely follow different inventions on the Internet to see if they are applicable, we are in close contact with the defense establishment to understand the IDF’s needs, and we also draw on our own experience as soldiers and active reservists.”
ALONGSIDE THE UAV squadron, the IDF and IAF have a number of additional squadrons and units that operate UAVs. The UAV squadron uses the Heron 1 UAV, while another IAF squadron uses the Hermes 450, Israel’s primary attack drone according to foreign reports and similar to the Predator, which is used extensively by the US in targeted killings in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The IAF is now planning the establishment of an additional UAV squadron by the end of 2012 which will incorporate the Heron 1 and the Hermes 900, a larger version of the Hermes 450 with the ability to carry larger payloads.
In the ground forces, drones are used under the Sky Rider Program, which saw the delivery of Elbit’s Skylark 1 to IDF battalions in 2010 as part of an effort to provide commanders with quick over-the-hill intelligence without being dependent on the IAF. The Defense Ministry is now evaluating the Skylark II as a drone for brigade commanders.
At the top level, called HALE (high altitude long endurance), the IAF has purchased a number of Heron TP UAVs from IAI which have the ability to stay airborne for days at a time and which for that reason have become known in Israel as “the drone that can reach Iran.” The squadron that is planned to operate the Heron TP is slated to become operational by the end of 2011.
“This UAV puts us at a new level when it comes to gathering intelligence,” a senior IAF officer explained.
“Due to its size it can carry multiple payloads and conduct a wide variety of missions at the same time.”
The Israeli genius is not just in the development of the drone itself but just as importantly in the payloads it carries and the systems that operate it. IAI and Elbit, for example, have made names for themselves for developing autonomous takeoff and landing systems. All it takes is four buttons to get the Heron TP, which is as wide as a Boeing 737, turned on and off the ground.
The missions a drone can carry out range from regular surveillance to airstrikes. In Gaza, for example, the Palestinians have given the drones the nickname Zanana, for the buzzing sounds they make as they fly over the Hamas-controlled territory.
“Drones are best for what are known as ‘3D’ missions – dull, dirty and dangerous,” the top IAF officer said.
“Its operation costs are less than a manned aircraft, people are not put in danger and it can sometimes even do a better job.”
One example is in the Navy, which currently uses helicopters to fly ahead of ships and help it build a picture of the sea out of range of what the ship-based radars can see. Each helicopter has a crew of at least three officers who can sometimes sit for hours going back and forth over an ocean.
“Why put a crew’s life in danger on missions that are dull and boring when the same mission can be done by a UAV,” a defense official said.
For that reason, the navy has been conducting a number of experiments with different long-range UAVs with the aim of finding one that can take off from a ship and land there as well.
THE FUTURE world of UAVs is inside the small caravans at the Palmahim Air Force Base where young male and female officers in jumpsuits sit in front of consoles lined with large TV screens watching the surveillance footage stream in from the drone they are moving with the nearby joystick.
These small and mobile command caravans put the UAV operator at a safe distance from the mission, wherever it might be – over the Gaza Strip or in Lebanon, tracking Hamas and Hezbollah arms transfers.
The numbers are already overwhelming, with the IAF recording a dramatic increase of in-flight hours in the past decade. Today, UAVs make up around a third of the IAF’s overall annual flight hours. It also produces a couple hundred hours of visual intelligence (VISINT) on a daily basis which then have to be processed and catalogued.
In the IAF there is no question that while UAVs have made a tremendous leap in the past 20 years, it is just the beginning. At the force’s recent “2030 Workshop,” IAF commander Nehushtan spoke of a future when the air force’s fleet will consist just of the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and UAVs.
“No one would have thought 20 years ago that we would be where we are today, and it is difficult to accurately predict where we will be in another 20 years,” a senior defense official from MAFAT said, adding with a smile: “Ultimately, the sky is the limit.”
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